Smith-fairness and the no-weak-spoiler criterion
Schulze's beatpath method
Elections with many or few voters
Irrelevant comparisons and the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem
Strategic voting and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Winner selection versus ranking
Irrelevant alternatives and Arrow's theorem
Fairness and envy-freeness
Pareto-optimality and equitability
Equality, equitability, and Knaster's procedure
Envy-free, pareto-optimal, and equitable cake cutting
"I cut, you choose" for three: Steinhaus's method
"I cut, you choose" for more than three: Kuhn's method
The method of Selfridge and Conway
The geometry of pareto-optimal division between two people
The adjusted winner method of Brams and Taylor
Conflict resolution using the adjusted winner method
The effect of dishonesty on the adjusted winner method
Dividing a piecewise homogeneous cake among N>2 people.
